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ARGUMENT
The O'Connells raise three arguments in their response and
cross-appeal: (1) that they only agreed to the narrow arbitration
language in the 1993 Application; (2) that the trial court
correctly excluded the O'Connells' claims based upon the
conversion statute (the "'statutory' claim") from arbitration,
but incorrectly included the O'Connells' remaining claims; and
(3) this Court should not award Blue Cross its attorney fees.
I.

THE O'CONNELLS AGREED TO THE BROAD ARBITRATION LANGUAGE OF
THE SUBSCRIBER CERTIFICATE
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Consider the Broad
Language of the Subscriber Certificate

The trial court found in its initial ruling that the
O'Connells agreed to certain language in the application for
insurance coverage under the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's policy (the
"Application").

Specifically, under the Application, the

1 O'Connells agreed to "accept binding arbitration as a method of
I resolving any disputes . . . concerning the applicability of, or
benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement."

(R. 79).

At that time, the trial court did "not reach the issue of
whether the subscriber certificate also provided plaintiffs with
additional notice of BCBSU's arbitration policy" (R. 187) because
it found "the application constituted a valid agreement to
arbitrate."

(R. 187).

The subscriber certificate, contained in

the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's policy, the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's

258105 1

Healthcare Agreement (the "Certificate")/ arguably contains
broader language than the Application.

Specifically, under the

Certificate, the O'Connells agreed that "In the event of any
dispute or controversy concerning the construction,
interpretation, performance or breach of the Agreement . . .
whether involving a claim in tort, contract or otherwise, the
same shall be submitted to arbitration . . . ."

(R. 85).

Later, the trial court reversed, in part, its ruling that
all of the O'Connells' claims were subject to arbitration under
the Application, on the grounds that one of the O'Connells'
claims was purportedly based upon statutory rights (the
"'statutory' claim"), and because the trial court had "some
reservations in leaving such issues of statutory interpretation
to arbitration."

(R.

206). This ruling was error because it

did not even consider Blue Cross' argument that the Certificate
encompassed all of the O'Connells' claims, including the socalled 'statutory' claim.
B.

The O'Connells Agreed to the Terms of the Certificate

The O'Connells now assert that they are not bound by the
broader language of the subscriber certificate.
Brief, pp. 18-22).

(O'Connells'

This argument fails for a number of reasons.

First, the O'Connells' own complaint (the "Complaint") seeks
to enforce rights under the very contract that contains the
arbitration language the O'Connells now seek to avoid.
258105.1
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For

example, the O'Connells allege in the First Cause of Action that
"Defendant has breached its contract obligation under the terms
of the subscriber certificate issued to members of the Rowland
Hall group . . . ."

Complaint, H 21 (R. 5) (emphasis added).

A

number of similar allegations are made throughout the Complaint.
See, e.g., Complaint % 9 (alleging that "Defendant also agreed in
the Subscriber Certificate, issued to Ann O'Connell as a member
of the Rowland Hall group . . . .") (emphasis added); % 13
(alleging that "Defendant agreed, in the Subscriber Certificate
issued to members of the Rowland Hall group . . . .") (emphasis
added).

All of these allegations turn upon the "contract" that

is the Certificate, containing the arbitration language the
O'Connells now seek to avoid.

Obviously, the O'Connells do not

have the right to choose only those provisions of the contract
they wish to enforce, while ignoring the others.
This precise situation arose in Jeanes v. Arrow Insurance
Company, 494 P.2d 1334 (Ariz. App. 1972), where a plaintiff
brought a claim as a third party beneficiary to an uninsured
motorist policy.

Ld. at 1334.

In that case, the plaintiff

argued that because she had not signed the contract containing
the arbitration provision, she was not bound by its terms.
at 1337.

Id.

The court rejected that argument, holding that there --

as here -- "[t]he rights here involved were created by that
contract [containing the arbitration agreement], and in order to

258105.1

3

accept benefits under that contract she must accept and abide by
the terms of the contract."

Id. (emphasis added).

Accordingly,

as alleged in the Complaint, the Certificate applies to all of
the O'Connells' claims.1
Second, Ann O'Connell does not deny receiving the Policy in
her Affidavit submitted to the trial court, instead noting that
she "does not know when she received a Subscriber Certificate."
(R. 129, 133) .2

However, under Utah law, if Blue Cross sent the

policy to the O'Connells, and it was not rejected in 30 days, its
terms are binding.

Specifically, the Insurance Code mandates

that renewal of an insurance policy on different terms is
effective upon mailing:
*

^

[I]f the insurer offers or purports to renew the
^
**$^
policy, but on less favorable terms or at higher rates, c e
j^
the new terms or rates take effect on the renewal date J
^M
>0
if the insurer delivered or sent by first class mail to
m\^^
the policy holder notice of the new terms or rates at
'*
jV
>
least 30 days prior to the expiration date of the prior
0^r
+>*<>/
policy.
(&'<*
t^p

_n

1

The trial court implicitly found this was the case when
it found "that by signing the application the plaintiff assented
to BCBSU's arbitration policy."
(R. 186).
2

What Ann O'Connell does admit, however, is finding a
Blue Cross policy in her files that contains language
substantively identical to the broad language of the Policy. (R.
129, 133). Accordingly, the fact that the O'Connells future
disputes with Blue Cross might or would be subject to arbitration
cannot be characterized as a surprise to the O'Connells.
258105 1
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Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(5)(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 3

In

fact, the trial court specifically found that "after their
application was accepted the plaintiffs were mailed a subscriber
certificate containing more detailed information about BCBSU's
arbitration policy."

(R. 187). This finding was specifically

supported by the Affidavit of Edwina H. Green and Karen Shields,
and is not challenged by the O'Connells on appeal.

(R. 172-178).

Furthermore, as demonstrated by the record, regardless of
which policy the O'Connells seek to enforce through the
Complaint, every insurance policy issued by Blue Cross to the
O'Connells contained an arbitration provision.

See Affidavit of

Karen Shields; Affidavit of Edwina H. Green (R. 172-177; see also
(R. 162) (Application for Rowland Hall Policy); (R. 44, 167)
(Application for Bar Policy); (R. 30, 160) (Bar Policy;
Subscriber Certificate to Bar Policy); (R. 84-85, 165-166) (Type
5E4 Policy); (R. 133) (Type 4M-4ML); (R 153) (Endorsement to
Subscriber Certificate); (R. 156) (Type 4M-4MM).

Therefore, the

O'Connells are bound by the terms of the policy, including the

3

Numerous courts have enforced similar statutes, holding
that actual receipt is not required under these circumstances.
See, e.g.
Atlanta
Cas. Co. v Sweeney,
868 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Ark.
1994)
("Whether the notice was received by [the insured] is
irrelevant according to the statute, as 'proof of mailing' is
'sufficient proof of notice.'"); Isaacson
v DeMartin
Agency,
Inc.,
893 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Wash. App. 1995) ("Although [the
insured] stated she did not receive a cancellation notice an
insurer is not required to prove actual receipt if statutory
mailing procedures are followed.").
258105.1
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arbitration provision, despite their contention that the terms of
the policy do not apply to them because they either didn't read,
or don't remember receiving, the policy.
Third, it is undisputed that after receiving the
Certificate, and any other relevant policies, the O'Connells
continued their insurance coverage with Blue Cross.

Under these

circumstances, it is clear that an insured's retention of an
insurance policy for an extended period of time, without
objection within a reasonable time, "constitutes an acceptance of
J

the Policy, including the arbitration provision."

Imperial Sav.

Ass'n v. Lewis, 730 F. Supp. 1068, 1073 (D. Utah 1990); see also

I
Western Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barela, 441 P.2d 47, (N.M.

J
1968); Phillis Dev. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 457 P.2d
558 (Okla. 1969)).

In this case, the Application was signed in

1993, and the trail court found the O'Connells had received the
policy by mail.

No objection was raised until approximately

1996, approximately three years after the Application was signed.
Under Imperial, the O'Connells have waived any right to object to
the terms of the Certificate.
Finally, the O'Connells cannot escape the terms of the
Certificate by reliance upon Ann O'Connells' assertion in her
Affidavit that she "has not read either version" of the

258105.1
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Subscriber Certificates4 (R. 129) . As the trial court noted,
Utah "case law is clear that a party has a duty to read and
understand the terms of a contract before signing it."

(R. 186);

Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Utah 1984) (holding
that a party has a duty to read and understand the terms of a
contract before signing it). Finally, this Court should reject
the implication that the O'Connells, an experienced educator (R.
127) and an attorney, were somehow ambushed by Blue Cross,
because they never bothered to read any of the many arbitration
agreements in every single one of their policies.
II.

ALL OF THE O'CONNELLS' CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO
ARBITRATION, UNDER EITHER THE APPLICATION OR THE
CERTIFICATE
A.

The Arbitration Agreement(s) Are Unambiguous and Apply
to the O'Connells' Claims

The O'Connells attempt to invoke principles of insurance
contract interpretation to escape their obligation under the
unambiguous terms of the arbitration agreement(s), arguing that
the arbitration agreement(s) is/are contracts of "adhesion"5 and

4

Little weight should be given Ann O'Connell's
recollection -- since Ann O'Connell "does not recall filling out
or signing the application," yet admits "the hand writing [sic]
and signature appear to be her's [sic] . . . . " (R. 2 ) .
5

The mere fact that the Blue Cross contracts are "adhesion"
contracts should not come as a surprise to the O'Connells, nor
does the O'Connell's inference that something is somehow wrong
with adhesion contracts in the insurance industry weigh against
Blue Cross. The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged,
(continued...)
258105.1
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invoking the principle that insurance policies "should be
strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the
insured . . . ."

O'Connells' Brief, p. 26 (quoting U.S. Fidelity

and Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521-23 (Utah 1993)).
First, the O'Connells fail to acknowledge that the rule of
construction upon which the rely only applies in the face of an
ambiguous term of the policy.

See, e.g. Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523

("If an ambiguity arises, the rules of construction outlined
above must be employed to resolve the ambiguity.").

A court will

not construe an insurance policy against the insured, absent an
ambiguity.

Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins., 839 P.2d

798, 807 (Utah 1992) (holding the Court had "no occasion to
consider" the "application of the canon of construction resolving
ambiguities against the drafter, " "because the disputed exclusion
is not ambiguous.")

Furthermore, Sandt and other cases

construing insurance policies in favor of the insured apply this
doctrine to determine the scope of insurance coverage, construing
coverage broadly in favor of the insured.

Sandt, 854 P.2d at 522

("ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract . . .
should be construed in favor of coverage.").
The arbitration agreements at issue are not ambiguous.

5

(...continued)
"that form contracts are essential to the economic viability of
the insurance industry." Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas.
Ins., 839 P.2d 798, 803 n.6 (Utah 1992).
258105.1
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Under Utah law, for contract language to be ambiguous it must be
"capable or more than one reasonable interpretation because of
'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies.'11

Wiengar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 108

(Utah 1991) (emphasis added).

In deciding whether an insurance

policy is ambiguous, the Court should apply a "reasonable
purchaser" standard.

Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523.

In this case, the

trial court specifically found that "the arbitration provision in
the 1993 application was clearly worded, unambiguous, and not
subject to more than one reasonable interpretation."6 (R. 188).
A review of the arbitration agreement reveals the correctness of
this ruling.

See, supra, discussion of Application and

Certificate.

In this regard, the trial court noted "that a

reasonable purchaser of insurance would be able to read the
provision [of the Application] and understand that he/she was
agreeing to submit any disputes to binding arbitration."
188).

(R.

Therefore, the rules of interpretation urged by the

O'Connells do not apply.
Second,

even if there were an ambiguity, the Supreme Court

has been unequivocal about the broad construction of arbitration
agreements, specifically holding that if the scope is ambiguous

6

It should be noted that the trial court relied upon
Sandt, the same case cited by the O'Connells, in determining the
Application was not ambiguous. (R. 188).
258105.1
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or debatable, construction is in favor of arbitration:
It is our policy to interpret arbitration clauses
in a manner that favors arbitration. In Lindon
City v.

Engineers

Construction

Co.,

we stated:

[Arbitration] is a remedy freely bargained
for by the parties, and "provides a means of
giving effect to the intention of the
parties, easing court congestion, and
providing a method more expeditious and less
expensive for the resolution of disputes
Arbitration clauses should be liberally
interpreted when the issue contested is the scope
of the clause. If the scope of the clause is
debatable or reasonably in doubt, the clause
should be construed in favor of arbitration . . .
636 P.2d at 1073 (quoting King County v. Boeing
Co., 18
Wash.App. 5954, 602-03, 570 P.2d 713, 717 (1977).
Our interpretation of the contract in favor of
arbitration is therefore in keeping with our policy of
encouraging extrajudicial resolution of disputes when
the parties have agreed not to litigate.
Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479
(Utah 1986) (emphasis added); see also Lindon City v. Engineers
Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981).

Because the scope

of the insurance coverage is not at issue, the principle of
construction urged by the O'Connells does not conflict with the
rule that the arbitration agreement(s) must be construed in favor
of arbitration.
The O'Connells also imply that arbitration is somehow an
inadequate or unfavorable remedy.

This position has been

rejected by the Utah courts for many years, and the tradition of
enforcing arbitration agreements is well founded in Utah.

See,

e.g. Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 946
258105.1
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(Utah 1996) (" [T]he Utah Arbitration Act "'reflects long-standing
public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of
adjudicating disputes.'") (citation omitted); Robinson & Wells,
P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983) ("The Territory and
State of Utah have had statutory provisions for arbitration of
disputes since 1884."); Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442, 15
P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1932) (" [A] arbitration is favored in the law
. . . .

ff

).

In fact, to the average insured (who is not a trial

lawyer), the prospect of arbitration is much cheaper and more
efficient than a jury trial.

Under the arbitration agreements,

the insured can force Blue Cross to proceed to arbitration.

If

construction is to be made of this contract in favor of "the
insured," it should be based upon the interest of the average
insured, not the subjective desires of the O'Connells.
In sum, the fact that arbitration is favored renders the
rule of construction in favor of the insured inapplicable to an
arbitration provision in an insurance contract.

In Imperial,

Judge Winder considered and rejected the exact arguments made by
the O'Connells:

Relying on Metropolitan

Property

& Liability

Ins.

Co. v. Finlayson,
751 P.2d 254 (Utah App. 1988),
vacated,
appeal
dismissed,
766 P.2d 437 (Utah App.
198 9), Imperial argues that this ambiguous provision in
the insurance contract should be construed against
Stewart as the drafter.
. . . . this court believes that an arbitration
clause is distinguishable from other provisions in an
insurance contract. Furthermore, the court is of the
258105.1
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opinion that an arbitration clause is not to be
construed as favoring one party over the other. Hence,
this court does not conclude that, even if this
arbitration provision were considered ambiguous, the
arbitration provision would be construed against
Stewart and rendered ineffective.
73 0 F.Supp. at 1075 (emphasis added). 7
The O'Connells cannot dispute Utah's long history of
favoring arbitration, and simply citing to another doctrine of
interpretation -- that insurance contracts are construed against
the insured -- does not, and cannot, change over 100 years of
Utah law favoring arbitration in all kinds of disputes.

Under

Utah law, this Court must construe the arbitration agreement(s)
as broadly as possible, resolving all doubts in favor of
arbitration, and holding that the O'Connells' entire Complaint is
subject to arbitration.

7

Even the only legal authority cited by the O'Connells
does not support their argument. The O'Connells cite only
Wheeler v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1977), for the
proposition that the arbitration agreement(s) is/are ambiguous.
This authority is of no help to the O'Connells. First, as
explained, regardless of the Wheeler court's opinion of the
arbitration provision at issue in that case, the arbitration
agreement(s) in this case are not ambiguous. Second, Wheeler,
along with a number of other cases cited by the O'Connells at the
trial court level, was specifically rejected by the trial court
on the grounds that it "involve[d] a factual scenario where a
patient was required to sign an arbitration agreement immediately
prior to receiving medical treatment." (R. 189). Obviously, the
facts of Wheeler are not analogous to those at hand -- where an
attorney and educator purchased health insurance through their
employment, with years to consider all their options prior to
entering into any contract and continued coverage after receiving
a copy of the policy.
258105.1
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B.

The Trial Court Incorrectly Excluded the 'Statutory'
Claim From Arbitration

Blue Cross specifically appeals the trial court's finding
that the O'Connells' Third Cause of Action, the so-called
'statutory' claim, falls outside the scope of the arbitration
agreement(s).
1.

The O'Connells Cannot Plead Around Arbitration

The interpretation urged by the O'Connells, if accepted,
would only encourage plaintiffs to file claims asserting a
multitude of legal theories in an effort to keep at least some of
them in litigation.

Again, the well-established rule that all

doubts are resolved in favor of arbitration governs this issue.
In Docutel, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly rejected the type
of argument raised by the O'Connel's.

In that case, a federal

trial court did exactly what the trial court has done here granted arbitration as to some claims, but not others.
at 477.

731 P.2d

The Utah Supreme Court unequivocally rejected this

approach, for two reasons - the possibility of inconsistent
results, and public policy against allowing clever plaintiffs to
plead around arbitration.

The Docutel court reasoned:

By allocating the claim in part to litigation and in
part to arbitration based only upon the language of the
complaint, the federal court has created an entirely
avoidable set of problems. For example, if
simultaneous judicial and arbitration proceedings
render inconsistent results, the parties could be faced
with a situation in which a court had reviewed the
evidence and determined Brady and Systems were not
258105.1
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liable, and an arbitrator whose decision could be
enforced as a judgment, had reviewed the same evidence
and determined that Brady and Systems should pay the
same debt.
Id. at 477 n.3.

The court went on to address a plaintiff's

inability to escape arbitration by artful pleading:
Further, we do not think that an agreement to arbitrate
should be interpreted so narrowly that its application
may be avoided by choosing to plead one legal theory
instead of another. Such narrow interpretation is
inconsistent with the strong state and federal policies
favoring arbitration and indeed invites potential
litigants to attempt to escape arbitration by clothing
their disputes in different legal theories.
Id. at 477 n.3 (emphasis added).
Here, the trial court did exactly what the Docutel court has
prohibited - it split a claim originally asserted as a violation
of a statute and a contract (the Certificate) into a wholly
'statutory' claim.

The O'Connells' argument that their

'statutory' claim is somehow different from any other contractual
claim is nothing more than a belated and convenient attempt to
plead around the arbitration clause.

Under Docutel, this Court

must reject such an attempt, construe the arbitration
agreement(s) broadly, and enforce arbitration.
2.

By the Terms of the O'Connells' Complaint, the
Statutory Claim is Contractual - and Arbitrable

The O'Connells' own Complaint characterizes the 'statutory'

258105.1
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claim as contractual.8

Upon reconsideration, the trial court

incorrectly characterized the Third Cause of Action as solely
statutory and indicated it had "some reservations in leaving such
issues of statutory interpretation to arbitration."9

(R. 206).

This ruling is in error for a number of reasons.
Only after Blue Cross moved to compel arbitration did the
O'Connells' change this characterization in an obvious attempt to
plead around the arbitration agreement(s).
pleading reflects this simple fact.

The O'Connells'

In pleading this claim to

the district court, the O'Connells alleged:
Defendant has breached its contract and statutory
obligation to provide individual coverage to plaintiffs
comparable to that provided through the Rowland Hall
group at a reasonable rate and not based upon condition
of the plaintiff's health.
R. 6 (emphasis added); see also Complaint U 9 (alleging that
"Defendant also agreed in the Subscriber Certificate, issued to
Ann O'Connell as a member of the Rowland Hall group . . . . " ) , H
13 (alleging that "Defendant agreed, in the Subscriber

8

As noted, the contract the O'Connells base their claims
upon is the exact same contract containing the Certificate's
arbitration agreement.
9

The trial court's "reservations" over the arbitrator's
skills or abilities is exactly the kind of bias against
arbitration that has been disfavored for decades by the appellate
courts of this state. In short, "Utah law presumes that an
arbiter appointed and authorized by the parties is capable of
examining legal documents and statutes to determine questions of
construction or validity." Allred v. Educators Mur. Ins. Ass'n,
909 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added).
258105 1
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Certificate issued to members of the Rowland Hall group . . .
.") .

This allegation is clearly covered by the terms of the
Application, providing for arbitration of "any disputes arising
between me or the covered family members in the Plan or
participating provider concerning the applicability of, or
benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement."
(emphasis added).

(R. 79)

The gist of this claim is that the conversion

policy provided to the O'Connells does not provide comparable
benefits to those offered in the first policy -- the Certificate.
This dispute therefore plainly concerns those "benefits," because
it contemplates comparing the "benefits payable" under the two
policies.

In addition, the allegation of this claim plainly

seeks conversion "benefits" under the Blue Cross policy -- and
the conversion right is a benefit that arises only because of the
original policy.

That policy, of course, is governed by the

Application and Certificate.
For the same reasons, the purported 'statutory' claim is
even more clearly covered by the terms of the Certificate,
providing for arbitration of "any dispute or controversy
concerning the construction, interpretation, performance or
breach of the Agreement arising between the Group, employer, or
Subscriber, eligible Family Dependent, or the heir-at-law or
personal representative of such person, and BCBSU, whether

258105.1
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involving a claim in tort, contract or otherwise, . . . "
(emphasis added).

(R. 85)

Accordingly, the trial court erred in

excluding the O'Connells' Third Cause of Action from the order
compelling arbitration.
3.

The O'Connells' Supposed Statutory Claim
Necessarily Arises Out of the Contractual
Relationship

As explained in the opening brief, and as never refuted by
the O'Connells, a conversion right arises out of, and is related
to, the original policy that gave right to the claim to
See Greany

conversion coverage.
Co.,

Western

973 F.2d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 1992).

Picks ley-Richards
Quails

v.

v.

Blue

West,
Cross

of

Inc.,

Farm Bureau

Life

See also Tingey

Ins.

v.

953 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1992);

California,

22 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1994)

(all three holding that conversion policy arises out of original
ERISA coverage, and therefore claim for benefits is preempted).
Similarly, any claim the O'Connells might raise concerning
their conversion coverage, or Blue Cross' alleged failure to
provide appropriate conversion coverage, necessarily presupposes
a pre-existing contractual relationship with Blue Cross.

In

fact, the O'Connells allege precisely the existence of a
preexisting contractual relationship under the Certificate.

They

recognized this when they plead their 'statutory' claim as based
on statute and contract.

It was only after Blue Cross attempted

to invoke the arbitration clause that the O'Connells converted
258105.1
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their claim into one purportedly based upon statute only.
However, without an existing contractual relationship, there is
no right to conversion.

Accordingly, all of the O'Connells'

potential claims concerning their conversion rights necessarily
arise out of the performance by Blue Cross of its original
contractual obligations.
C.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled the O'Connells'
Remaining Claims Were Subject to Arbitration

The O'Connells challenge trial court's ruling that the
O'Connells' First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action were all
subject to arbitration.

(R.183-191).

The trial court's ruling

was correct.
1.

This Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Review
the Trial Court's Ruling Granting Arbitration

This Court ruled on August 8, 1997 that the O'Connells could
appeal the trial court's ruling granting arbitration based upon
"Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and
considerations of judicial economy."

Order, August 8, 1997.

Blue Cross respectfully request reconsideration of this decision
as contrary to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the intent of
the Utah Arbitration Act, and the policy favoring arbitration.
In short, Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
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Procedure10 does not confer jurisdiction11 because an order
compelling arbitration is conspicuously absent from the list of
orders respecting arbitration made appealable in Utah Code Ann. §
78-31a-19.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-19 (1996).

Notably, there is

no provision allowing immediate appeal from an order compelling
arbitration.
The authority is unequivocal in accepting this position.
For example, the court in Gooding v. Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc.,
878 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1989), addressed the identical issue under
the Federal Arbitration Act,12 dismissing an appeal from an
order compelling arbitration for lack of jurisdiction.

Id. at

283; see also, Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1989)
(acknowledging jurisdiction over an order denying a motion to

10

In addition, as a procedural matter, it should be noted
that the O'Connells did not pursue appeal of the trial court's
ruling as an interlocutory appeal. (R. 260); see Utah R. App. P.
5(a) (requiring that "[a]n appeal from an interlocutory order . .
. be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to
appeal from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the
appellate court with jurisdiction . . . . " ) .
Accordingly, the
O'Connells' appeal is not before the Court as an interlocutory
appeal.
11

Rule 1(d) specifically states that " [t]hese rules shall
not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as established by law." Utah
R. App. P. (1(d). Nor is there any provision that Blue Cross can
locate allowing jurisdiction based upon judicial economy.
12

Utah looks "to the law of other states and to federal
case law for guidance" to interpret similar provisions in the
Utah Arbitration Act. Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake
Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1996).
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compel arbitration as to certain claims, while dismissing crossappeals of orders compelling arbitration as to the remaining
claims for lack of jurisdiction); NEA-Topeka v. Unified School
Dist. , 925 P.2d 835, 838 (Kan. 1996) ("Orders directing, or
refusing to stay, arbitration are not appealable.") (quoting
Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 751 P.2d
146, rev, denied, 243 Kan. 779 (1988)); see also, Golden Lodge
No. 13 v. Easlev, 916 P.2d 666, 667 (Colo. App. 1996) (" [A] n
order directing arbitration . . .
arbitration has been completed.").

is not appealable until the
Therefore, as a threshold

issue, this Court lacks jurisdiction to even consider the
O'Connells' cross-appeal of the trial court's order compelling
arbitration.
2.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled the O'Connells'
Remaining Claims Were Subject to Arbitration

Even if this Court decides to address the O'Connells' crossappeal of the trial court's order compelling arbitration, that
ruling must be upheld because the O'Connells' claims are clearly
within the scope of the arbitration agreement(s).

As noted,

supra, it is well-established in Utah that arbitration agreements
are to be construed broadly with all doubts resolved in favor of
arbitration, and the trial court found that the language of the
Application was unambiguous, and included the O'Connells' other
claims.
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The First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action all allege
breach of the insurance contract that is subject to (and in fact
contains) the arbitration agreement(s) to which the O'Connells
object.

The First Cause of Action alleges that "Defendant has

breached its contract obligation under the terms of the
subscriber certificate . . . ." (R. 5) (emphasis added).

The

Second Cause of Action alleges that "Defendant has breached its
contract obligation to fulfill its promise, made orally and by
letter, . . . ."

(R. 6) (emphasis added).

The Fourth Cause of

Action alleges that "Defendant has, pursuant to the contracts
alleged supra and the long standing relationship between
plaintiffs and defendant, a constructive duty to deal with
plaintiffs fairly and in good faith and breached that duty
. . . ."

(R. 7) (emphasis added).

In addition, counts common to

all these claims specifically reference the Certificate. See
Complaint H 9 (alleging that "Defendant also agreed in the
Subscriber Certificate, issued to Ann O'Connell as a member of
the Rowland Hall group . . . . " ) ,

H 13 (alleging that "Defendant

agreed, in the Subscriber Certificate issued to members of the
Rowland Hall group . . . .") .
All three of these claims allege breach of a contract
between the parties, and dispute the health insurance benefits
the O'Connells are entitled to.

These allegation are clearly

covered by the terms of the Application, providing for
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arbitration of "any disputes arising between me or the covered
family members in the Plan or participating provider concerning
the applicability of, or benefits payable under the Subscriber
Agreement."

(R. 79) (emphasis added).

The allegations of the

First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action are even more clearly
covered by the terms of the Certificate, providing for
arbitration of "any dispute or controversy concerning the
construction, interpretation, performance or breach of the
Agreement arising between the Group, employer, or Subscriber,
eligible Family Dependent, or the heir-at-law or personal
representative of such person, and BCBSU, whether involving a
claim in tort, contract or otherwise . . . "

(R. 85).

One additional argument must be addressed.

For the first

time on appeal, the O'Connells allege the existence of a
"separate oral and written promise to allow the O'Connells to
transfer back and forth between groups."
32 (emphasis added).

O'Connells' Brief, p.

There is no evidence in the record of a

separate written or oral promise other than those made in the
various insurance policies purchased by the O'Connells.

To this

end, and as has been repeated numerous times already, every claim
raised by the O'Connells' Complaint is based in contract,
specifically the Certificate.

(R. 3-8).

Even if this were not

the case, there is no showing of a separate contract in the
record, nor can the O'Connells show any consideration for such a
258105 1
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contract.13

To argue that Blue Cross somehow issued a wholly

individual and separate insurance policy to the O'Connells -different from every other policy issued to an insured -- and
perhaps did so over the telephone -- is completely lacking in
evidentiary support.

Because all the O'Connells' claims

necessarily arise out of one of the contracts containing an
arbitration clause, this belated attempt by the O'Connells to recharacterize their pleadings must be rejected.

See also,

Docutel, 731 P.2d at 477 n.3. ("[A]n agreement to arbitrate
should [not] be interpreted so narrowly that its application may
be avoided by choosing to plead one legal theory instead of
another.") .
Accordingly, the trial court correctly ordered that the
O'Connells' First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action were
subject to arbitration.
D.

Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements Does Not Violate
the Utah Constitution

The O'Connells' final argument is that enforcement of an
arbitration agreement somehow deprives them of basic rights under

13

The only consideration the O'Connells could arguably
have conveyed to Blue Cross is the premiums paid for the policy
governed by the Application and Certificate. If the O'Connells
contend this was the consideration for their claim of a separate
agreement, then they are necessarily arguing the policy was
somehow orally or otherwise modified. The arbitration
agreement(s) obviously apply to any modification of the original
contract.
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Article I, Section 7 (the Due Process Clause) and Article I,
Section 11 (the Open Courts Provision) of the Utah Constitution.
The Utah Supreme Court specifically rejected exactly these
arguments in Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070,
1073-74 (Utah 1981) .
III.

BLUE CROSS IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
The only argument the O'Connells make on the attorney fee

issue is that Blue Cross waived its right to request attorney
fees because the request was not made to the trial court.
However, Blue Cross has never waived its right to recover fees on
appeal.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-16, -19 (1996).

Under Utah

law, Blue Cross is entitled to attorney fees incurred in seeking
this appeal, separate and apart from any fee award by the trial
court.

Under these circumstances, the fact that Blue Cross has

not yet sought attorney fees from the trial court is irrelevant
- Blue Cross has an independent right to recover its attorney
fees on appeal under Section 78-31a-16 because the appeal right
is separate and independent from any ruling made by the trial
court.14

Because Blue Cross is entitled to an Order compelling

14

The only authority cited by the O'Connells, Sukin v.
Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah App. 1992) is inapplicable to this
case. First, Sukin does not address a situation where the right
to attorney fees arises directly and independently from the
appeal, and does not involve the Utah Arbitration Act. In fact,
Sukin doesn't even address the issue of attorney fees. See id.
at 926 (discussing allegation of bias against trial court, noting
(continued...)
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arbitration of all the O'Connells' claims, Blue Cross is entitled
to an award of attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-16 &
-19 (1996) .
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in refusing to compel arbitration
as to all of the O'Connells' claims against Blue Cross.

Each

such claim is plainly subject to the broad arbitration
agreement(s) agreed to by the O'Connells.

The Court should

reverse the district court's order severing the conversion claim
and remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration as to all
claims.

In addition, the remand order should direct the entry of

a reasonable attorneys' fee for BCBSU in connection with the
district court proceedings and this appeal, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-31a-16 (1997) .
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 3

day of April, 1998.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

SL^

By
Andrei H. Stone
James E. Magleby
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant

14

( . . . continued)
"we do not address the issue of bias or prejudice because it has
been raised for the first time on appeal.").
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